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I,  Introduction 
On October 19, 1987, the Standard  &  Poor's composite  portfolio fell from 282.70 to 224.84, 
or 20.4 percent.  This  is the largest  one day drop in the history of major stock market indexes from 
February 1885 through the end of 1988.  Following  this drop, daily stock  prices rose and fell by large 
amounts during the next  several weeks.  Thus, the fall in stock prices was followed  by a large increase 
in stock volatility. 
This paper documents  the behavior  of  daily stock returns before, during and after the October 
1987 crash.  It compares  and contrasts the  1987 crash with  previous  crashes.  It also analyzes  the 
behavior of prices for options on stock market portfolios and for futures contracts on the S&P 500, 
These contingent claims  contracts reinforce the conclusion that stock market volatility returned to 
lower,  more normal levels quickly following the 1987 crash.  This is unusual relative to the evidence 
from previous  crashes. 
Section 2  summarizes  some of the  literature on time-varying stock volatility.  Section 3 
contains  estimates  of the conditional standard deviations of daily stock returns from 1885-1987.  It 
shows that stock volatility  was unusually  high during the 1929-1934 and 1937-1938  depressions, and 
during the 1973-1974 OPEC recession.  Section 4 compares  the estimates of  daily stock volatility from 
the stock, options and futures markets during 1987- 1988. Section 5 summarizes  the empirical results 
and relates these findings to the October 1987 stock market crash. 
2.  Review of Previous Research 
Officer {1973J shows  that aggregate  stock volatility increased  during the Great Depression, 
as did the volatility of money growth  and industrial production. He also shows that stock volatilits was at similar levels before the Depression  as after.  So it is difficult  to credit the creation of the 
Securities  and Exchange  Commission (S.E.C.) with the reduction in stock  volatility that occurred after 
1939.  Benston  [1973] shows  that the  volatility of individual stocks,  and particularly, the part of 
volatility that is unrelated to general  market movementt.  did not decrease until well after the S.E.C. 
began itt operations in October 1934. Like Officer, Benston concludes  that the activities of the S.E.C. 
cannot be credited with lowering  stock volatility.  Schwert [1987]  analyzes  the relation of stock 
volatility with real and nominal  macroeconomic  volatility, financial leverage,  stock trading activity. 
default risk, and firm profitability using monthly  data from 1857-1986.  Schwert  [1989) shows that 
monthly stock volatility was higher during recessions and following the major banking crises from 
1834-1986  (also tee Wilson. Svlla and Jones [1988]).  Moreover, he shows that the Federal Reserve 
Board has raised margin  requirements  following  decreases in stock volatility during the period from 
1934-1987.  There is not evidence  that increases  in margin requirements has e been  followed  by 
reductions in volatility. French, Schwert and Stambaugh  [1987] show that stock volatility is highly 
persistent, and that on average  unexpected  increases in volatility are associated with negative stock 
returns.  They also show there is weak evidence  that expected  risk premiums are positively related 
to expected stock volatility. 
3, Estimates of Conditional  Stock k'olatiliti' 
3.1 Extreme  Changes  in Stock Prices 
Table I  lists the 50 largest  increases  and decreases  in daily stock returns from February 16, 
1885 through 1987.  This sample  includes 28.884 daily stock returns. From 1885 through 1927, luse 
a composite  of the Dow Jones Industrial and Railroad  Averages,  weighted  by the number of stocks 
in each index (Dow Jones [1972]).  From January 1928 to the present, I use the Standard & Poors 
composite  portfolio (90 stocks  until March  1957, and 500 since that time -- see Standard & Poor's 
[1986]).  The Dow Jones portfolios are price-weighted, while the S&P portfolio is va1ue-weighted 
neither includes  dividends in the returns.1 
'For tve purposeE of meeuriog  took votatility dividend peyment ere unimportant, probably because ex-dividend datee 
differ across  stocke.  I  have compared th estimatee of volatility for the  CRSP value-weighted portfolio (that includee As mentioned at the beginning  of the paper, October 19, 1987, is the largest one day percent 
change in stock prices (-20.4 percent) Out of the sample  of 28,884  observations.  The next largest 
change  in stock prices  occurred on March 15,  1933, when stock prices rose 16.6 percent following 
the Federal Banking holiday. In perusing this list several patterns emerge.  First, there are many 
reversals, when large drops in stock prices have been followed by large increases in stock prices. For 
example, the 1929 stock market crash represents  the next two largest drops in stock prices, -12.3 and 
-10.2 percent on October28 and 29.  But the market rebounded  on October30 with the second largest 
one  day  gain in the sample,  12.5  percent.  This  is  characteristic of an  increase in stock market 
volatility; that is, an increased chance of large stock returns of indeterminate sign. In fact, 29 of  the 
50 most negative returns and 36 of the 50 most positive returns occur in the October  1929—July  1934 
period. The September  1937-September  1939 period accounts for 7 of the most negative and 5 of the 
most positive returns.  The week from October 19 through 26, 1987, accounts for 2  of the  most 
negative and 2 of  the most positive returns. March  1907 accounts for I large and 1 small return. July 
and August, 1893 contain  I of the smallest  and 2 of the largest returns, and May—November, 1940 
contain  2 of the smallest and  I of the largest returns.  These brief episodes  in stock market history 
represent 89  percent of the  extreme daily returns to aggregate  stock portfolios.  They are each 
characterized by high  levels of stock market volatility! 
Table 2 lists the 50 largest increases and decreases in monthly  stock returns from January 1834 
through the end of 1987.  This represents  1,848 monthly stock returns. Schwert  [19891 describes the 
construction of this stock return series.  Briefly,  from 1834-1856  I  use Smith and Cole's [19351 
portfolio of industrial and railroad stocks.  From 1857-1870  1 use Macaulay's [1938] portfolio of 
railroad stocks.  From 1871-1925  1  use the  Cowles [1939]  value—weighted portfolio of New  York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed stocks.  From  1926-1987  I use the Center for Research in Security 
dividende) with the S&P portfolio (that doe. not) over the  July 1962 -  December 1986 period,  and there are no irnportaot 
difference. in the estimates of stock volatility. 
2Cutter, Poterba  and Summer. [1989] analyse large daily returns from 1928-87 to see  whether  they are related to specific 
news events.  They  find that some, but not all of the large positive  or negative returns  occur at the some time as major  news 
stories.  One reason that return volatility could increase is that the volatility of the 'information  environment'  increase,. Table  1  —- The 50 Largest and Smallest Daily Returns to Market Portfolios,  1885-1987 
Smallest Daili' Returns  Larzest Daily Returns 
March  15, 1933  .166096 
1.  October 19, 1987  -.203881 
2.  October  28, 1929  —.123362  October  30, 1929  .125306 
3.  October  29, 1929  —.101583  October  6, 1931  .123583 
4.  November 6,  1929  -.099213  September21, 1932  .118110 
5.  October 18, 1937  -.092749  September  5, 1939  .096271 
6.  July 20, 1933  —.088793  April  20, 1933  .095238 
7.  July 21, 1933  —.087039  October 21, 1987  .090994 
8.  December 20, 1895  -.085 162  November  14, 1929  .089468 
9.  October 26, 1987  -.082790  August 3,  1932  .088586 
10.  October 5, 1932  —.08 1988  October 8, 1931  .085890 
11.  August 12,  1932  —.080158  February 13,  1932  .083744 
12.  May  31, 1932  -.078350  December 18, 1931  .082902 
13.  July26, 1934  —.078280  February  11, 1932  .082667 
14.  March  14, 1907  -.075887  July 24, 1933  .081359 
15.  May  14,  1940  -.074708  June 10, 1932  .076586 
16.  July 26, 1893  -073892  June  3, 1931  .075410 
17.  September24,  1931  —.072917  November 10,  1932  .075144 
18.  September 12,  1932  -.071754  October20,  1937  .074775 
19.  May  9, 1901  —.070246  June 19, 1933  .072289 
20.  June 15, 1933  -.069723  May  6, 1932  .072183 
21.  October 16, 1933  -.067814  ApriL  19, 1933  .072072 
22.  September 3, 1946  -.067267  August 15, 1932  .072046 
23.  May  28, 1962  -.066756  October 11, 1932  .071651 
24.  May 21,  1940  -.066394  January  6, 1932  .070199 
25.  September 26, 1955  —.066 184  October  14,  1932  .068966 
26.  November Il. 1929  -.062323  April 9,  1938  .067568 
27,  September21,  1933  -.061740  June 4, 1932  .067485 
28.  October 23, 1929  -.059073  September 23,  1931  .066667 
29.  October 5, 1931  -.058698  July27, 1893  .066109 
30.  May 13.  1940  -.058475  August 2,  1893  .065499 
31.  March 29, 1938  -.058252  May 10,  1901  .064426 
32.  November  19,  1937  -.058244  October 4,  1933  .064116 
33.  June 8,  1932  -.057732  March 15,  1907  .063940 
34.  September 14,  1932  -.057692  October 25, 1937  .063830 
35.  December 18,  1899  -.057639  April 29, 1933  .062580 
36.  September 13, 1938  -.057214  August 6,  1932  .061765 
37.  November 13, 1929  -.057128  November 4,  1932  .061728 
38.  September 7,  1937  -.057124  December 27, 1917  .061241 
39.  November 12, 1929  -.056898  June 20, 1931  .0605 14 
40.  June  16,  1930  -.056881  August 22, 1932  .058201 
41.  October21, 1932  -.056708  January  15,  1934  .057654 
42.  June  17,  1932  -.05664  1  November 7,  1940  .055607 
43.  September 26, 1932  —.056338  November 15, 1929  .055094 
44.  July 30, 1914  -.056296  August  17,  1933  .054902 
45.  March31, 1932  -.055556  March28, 1898  .054771 
46.  October 7,  1932  -.055 182  June 2. 1932  .054545 
47.  May 27, 1932  -.054795  June 3,  1932  .053879 
48.  March 25, 1938  -.054601  June 20, 1938  .053775 
49.  October 5,  1937  -.054452  November 10,  1937  .053744 
50.  December  12, 1929  -.054066  October 20,  1987  .053327 
4 Prices  (CRSP) value-weighted portfolio of  NYSE stocks.  The latter two portfolios  include dividends. 
I use the dividend yields from the Cowles portfolio from 1871-1879 to estimate the yields from 1834- 
1870. 
The results in Table 2 reinforce the conclusions  drawn from Table 1.  First, it  is worth noting 
that October 1987 is only the fourth lowest  return in the  1834-1987  sample.  The return for the 
month is similar to the return on October  19, implying that the large positive and negative returns 
for the rest of the month net to zero.  Second,  17 out of the 50 most negative and 12 Out of the 50 
most positive monthly returns are from 1929-1934.  The  1937—1939  period includes  5 of the most 
negative and 5 of the most positive returns. One of the largest  and one of the smallest returns come 
from 1987.  Again, a large proportion of both the largest  and the smallest returns come from brief 
subperiods in the overall 1834-1987 sample,  This shows an increase in stock volatility during these 
periods. 
The models in the next section provide  a more structured analysis of the time series properties 
of stock market volatility. 
3.2  Autoregressive  Models for Dat/c Stock  Volatility,  1885-1987 
There are several  stylized  facts  concerning stock return volatility.  First, it is persistent, so 
an increase in current volatility lasts for many  periods  (see Poterba and Summers  [1986], Schwert 
[19871 and French, Schwert and Stambaugh  [1987] for alternative estimates  of the persistence of 
stock volatility). Second, stock volatility  increases after stock prices fall (e.g.,  Black [19761, Christie 
[1982], French, Schwert and Starnbaugh [19871 and Nelson [1988]).  Third, stock volatility  is related 
to macroeconomic  volatility, recessions and to banking crises (Officer [1973], Schwert  [1987,  19891). 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  many competing parametric  models  to  represent conditional 
heteroskedasticity  of stock returns!  For this paper, I adopt a variation of the strategy followed  by 
French, Schwert and Stambaugh  [1987] and by Schwert  [1989].  First, stock returns are regressed on 
22  lagged  returns (about one  month) to estimate short-term movements in conditional expected 
addition to the modele ued in this poper, see Engle 19821, Bollerslev  119861  Engle and Boller.tsv [1986J, Engle, Lihen 
and Robini [19871 and Hamilton  5988J. Table  2 -- The 50  Largest and Smallest Monthly Returns to Market Portfolios,  1834-1987 
Smallest Mo,iz  h/v  Returns  Lareest  Monthli' Returns 
I.  September 1931  -.287943  April 1933  .376807 
2.  March 1938  -.234649  August 1932  .361922 
3.  May 1940  -.220209  July 1932  .326816 
4.  October  1987  -.216432  June 1938  .234906 
5.  May  1932  -.202061  May  1933  .210962 
6.  October  1929  -.195564  October  1974  .168000 
7.  April 1932  —.178743  September 1939  .159539 
8.  October  1857  —.159868  May  1843  .150365 
9.  June 1930  -.156625  December  1843  .144286 
10.  September 1857  —.150544  April 1938  .143594 
11.  September 1937  —.134523  November 1857  .138159 
12.  December  1931  -.133362  June 1931  .137463 
13.  May  1931  —.132673  January  1975  .134829 
14.  February 1933  —.131902  June 1933  .133754 
15.  October  1932  -.128920  January  1934  .129559 
16.  September 1930  ..123243  January  1987  .128229 
17.  November  1929  —.120445  January  1863  .127722 
18.  March  1939  -118577  July 1837  .127143 
19.  November  1855  -118571  January  1976  .125243 
20.  November  1973  -116105  August 1982  .125204 
21.  November  1860  -.110986  August 1933  .122209 
22.  September 1974  -.110282  November  1928  120004 
23.  March  1932  -.109674  October  1982  .115687 
24.  July 1934  —.108560  October 1879  .113708 
25.  March  1980  -.107585  November  1962  .111819 
26.  September 1933  -.105406  August 1984  .111442 
27.  January 1842  -.104821  November  1980  .107693 
28.  October  1978  -.102213  February 1931  .107665 
29.  October  1907  -.102177  February 1855  .105907 
30.  September 1946  —.100879  January  1861  .103825 
31.  April  1970  -.099774  June  1901  103602 
32.  April  1931  —.097886  July 1939  101113 
33.  July  1933  -.095421  November  1933  .100994 
34.  April  1837  -.095345  October 1862  .099834 
35.  April  1846  -.095345  June 1929  098897 
36.  October1937  -.094749  December 1873  .097287 
37.  March 1907  -.093834  April  1834  .096906 
38.  December  1854  —.093166  May 1863  .096312 
39.  January 1846  -.09232  1  November 1954  .095953 
40.  March  1865  —.091938  February  1858  .095089 
41.  November  1948  —.090507  December 1971  .090557 
42.  May 1837  -.090408  April 1968  .0897  12 
43.  November  1931  -.090172  March  1928  .089423 
44.  July 1893  —.088337  April 1935  .089247 
45.  August 1974  —.085370  May 1844  .087849 
46.  July  1854  -.084593  April  1901  .087279 
47.  May 1962  -.084524  February 1845  .085766 
48.  May 1893  -.083242  july 1937  .084136 
49.  November 1937  -.082932  August 1929  .083753 
50.  June  1962  —.082646  April  1978  .083471 
6 returns.  Dummy variables Dr representing the day-of—the-week are included to capture differences 
in mean returns (e.g.,  French  [19801  and Keim and Stambaugh  [19841).  The  residuals  from this 
regression, 
6  22  uR,- E  nrDu.  E  (1) 
estimate  the unexpected return on  day  t.  Following  Schwert [19891, the  absolute  residual  Un 
multiplied by the factor (lr/2)r estimates  the standard deviation of  the stock return in period t. This 
estimator is unbiased if the  conditional distribution of returns is normal (hereafter, the absolute 
residuals  IuJ are multiplied by (ir/2)). To estimate the conditional standard deviation of returns, I 
estimate  the regression, 
6  22 
IS1nt  =  a  D  +  E  p IU,) +  Vn ,  (2) 
i=1  j=1 
where the dummy variable coefficients  C measure the intercepts for different days of the week, and 
the autoregressive coefficients  measure  the persistence  of volatility. 
Table 3 contains estimates of equations (I) and (2) using the daily data from February 1885 
through December 1987.  Following  Davidian  and Carroll [19871, literate twice  between  equations 
(1)  and  (2)  to  calculate  weighted least squares  estimates.  The estimate of the equation for stock 
returns (1) is consistent with prior research.  The intercept for Monday  is reliably negative (-.13 
percent per day), while the intercepts for the other days of the week are reliably positive.4  The 
autoregressive coefficients are positive out to about two weeks  (10 to  12 trading days), with the 
largest estimate at lag I.  The autocorrelation  at lag  I is often attributed to nonsynchronous  trading 
of individual securities (Fisher [1966)  and Scholes  and  Williams  [1977)).  The  sum  of the 22 
autoregressive coefficients is  .18,  with  a t-statistic  of 9.0.  Thus, there is  a weak tendency for 
movements  in aggregate  stock returns to persist.  Despite the large t and F-statistics, the coefficient 
of determination R2 is only .013, showing that most of the movements  in daily stock returns are not 
4Thii o-c1Id wekend ef(ectn oxioto in oil of the docode from 1885-1854  up to the preont. 
7 explained by these factors. 
The estimate of the equatIon  for stock volatility (2)  is also consistent with prior research. 
The  intercept for Monday is  higher than for the other days of the  week,  and the intercept for 
Saturday is lower.  This shows that volatility is expected to be lower than average from the close of 
trading on Friday to the close on Saturday.  The negative intercept does not imply negative volatility 
predictions. since there  is  much persistence in volatility.  Saturday trading occurred from  1885 
through May 1952, but it lasted for only a half  day. Similarly,  volatility is expected to be higher than 
average  from the close of trading on Friday (or Saturday, when there was Saturday trading) to the 
close on Monday. This represents more calendar time.  Both of these effects are seen  by Keim and 
Stambawgh [1984]  using  the daily S&P  composite  returns from  1928-1984.  The  autoregressive 
coefficients are positive for all 22 lags, and many are more than  3 standard errors above zero. The 
largest coefficients  occur in the first 6 lags.  The sum of the 22 autoregressive  coefficients is .69, with 
a t-statistic of 52.2.  The prediction model  implied by (2) is a 22 period weighted average of the 
absolute  deviations, adjusted for day-of-the-week seasonal effects.5 Thus, there isa strong tendency 
for movements  in aggregate  stock returns to persist.  The coefficient of determination R2 is .237, 
showing that movements  in daily stock volatility are much more predictable  than movements  in stock 
returns, 
I have also estimated the model  in equations (1) and (2) using 44 lagged returns and volatility 
measures.  The estimate  of the return equation (1) is unaffected, in that the sum of the incremental 
22 lag coefficients is  .0063 with a t—statistic of .37.  On the other hand, the sum of the incremental 
22 lag coefficients in equation  (2) is .183 with a t—statistic of 6.45 (the sum for lags I through 44 is 
.888).  Thus, the persistence in conditional  volatility is stronger than the results  in Table 3 show. 
3.3  'Leverage'  Effects in the Return-J'oiatility Relation 
Black [1976], Christie [1982]. French, Schwert and Stambaugh  [1987] and Nelson [1988] all 
The optimal forecast function for an AR1MA(p,d,U)  procese ii a (p+d)  period rolling average of the ps.st observations, 
where the a'eighte euro to 1 if d>O.  A frequently used predictor of future  volatility is to calculate the standard  deviation of 
the  sot N daily returns.  Such an estimator implicitly assumes that the volatility followe a 000etatiunary ARIMA(N-l,l,O) 
process. eQ that the euro of the autoregressive coefficients  in Table 3 would  equal  1. Table 3 -- Estimates of Autoregressive Models for Daily Stock Returns and Volatility,  1885- 
1987, (using 22 lags and iterative weighted least squares) 
Stock Returns. R,  Stock Volatility,  uA 
Variable  Coefficient  T-stat  Coefficient  Iii1 
MON  -.001257  -9.92  .002328  12.80 
TUE  .000185  1.78  .001881  11.60 
WED  .000400  3.98  .001745  12.12 
THU  .000166  1.68  .001113  6.83 
FRI  .000710  7.08  .001341  9.21 
SAT  .000451  3.08  -.001212  -6.16 
Lags of  dependent variable: 
.1033  16.65  .1520  7.87 
2  -.0177  —3.22  .1215  10.12 
3  .0182  3.32  .0875  8.29 
4  .0262  4.33  .0526  5.07 
5  .0228  3.91  .0592  5.55 
6  -.0092  -1.63  .0702  6.26 
7  -.0134  -2.40  .0229  1.96 
8  .0143  2.39  .0332  2.51 
9  .0064  1.14  .0187  1.45 
10  .0040  .69  .0124  1.07 
11  .0098  1.70  .0217  2.07 
12  .0093  1.53  .0326  2.79 
13  -.0087  -1.44  .0021  .20 
14  .0040  .68  .0104  1.15 
15  .0027  .47  .0181  1.92 
16  -.0016  -.26  .0029  .26 
17  -.0025  -.42  .0156  1.48 
18  .0026  .45  .0268  2.89 
19  .0043  .77  .0093  .94 
20  .0055  .93  .0339  3.83 
21  -.0001  -.97  .0002  .22 
22  .0035  .61  .0338  3.67 
Sum of 
22 lags  .1838  9.04  .6856  52.19 
F—test for 
Equal Daily  Means  34.07  75.89 
.013  .237 
Noe Equations  (1) and (2) are eBtimated iteratively  using weighted least squares (WLS).  The t-statietme  use 
Hansen's  (19821  correction for autocorvelution and heteroakedasticity  to  calculate the  standard  error,, with  44 
lags of the residual  autocovariancea  and  a damping  factor  of .7 (the  RATS computer  program  was used to perform 
all of the calculations). The coefficient  of determination,  it2, is from  the ordinary least squares version  of these 
regressions. 
9 note that stock volatility is negatively  related to stock returns. In particular, an unexpected negative 
return is associated  with an unexpected increase in volatility. To represent the possible asymmetry 
in the relation between  stock returns aod stock volatility, I add lagged unexpected returns to the 
volatility equation, 
e  22  22 
u)  =  S  +  S  pJuJ  +  S  1eue+v,,  (3) 
1=1  j=s  k=t 
where the coefficients -y  measure the relation between  past return shocks and current conditional 
volatility.  If  the  distribution bf the return shocks  u  is  symmetric, u  and ]u) are uncorrelated. 
Negative correlation between  lu) and uNk is evidence of negative conditional skewness.  The  prior 
evidence suggests  that these coefficients should be negative. 
There are two hypotheses  that predict such a negative relation.  First, since she firms in the 
market portfolio have financial leverage,  a drop in the relative value of  stocks versus bonds increases 
the volatility of  the stock (tee Christie  11912]). Second, if  increases in predictable volatility increase 
discount rates of  future cash flows to stockholders,  but not the expected cath flows, then unexpected 
increases  in volatility will  cause  a drop in stock prices  (see,  for example. Poterba and  Summers 
[1986]). 
Table 4a contains estimates of a model  for stock returns that includes  lagged  values of the 
volatility measure  iu,l, 
C  22  22 
=  S aD+  S fiR+ S 8]u4j+u  (4) 
k=5 
where equation (1) is used in the first stage of an iterative process.  Then (3) and (4) are repeated to 
generate succestive values of u and lu).5  The day—of-the-week  intercepts and the autoregressive 
coefficients ,  are similar to the estimates in Table  3.  The coefficients 5 measure the effect of 
higher volatility on future stock returns,  The coefficient at lag  I  is reliably positive (3.52, with a 
tThie  iterative process wccld not yield consistent estimates if there  was a strong retatinc between stock rstcrnc and lagged 
volatility in (4).  Since ths  proportion of variation of retnrns explained by tagged retnrnn or volatilitiso is low,  thin problem 
ie not tikely to be important. 
10 Table 4a -- Estimates of Autoregressive Model  for Daily Stock Returns, Including Effects of 
Lagged Volatility, 1885-1987, (using 22 lags and iterative weighted  least squares) 
Variable  Coefficient  T—stat  Coefficient  T—stat 
MON  -000986  -7.44 
TUE  000060  .54 
WED  .000302  2.76 
THU  .000131  1.23 
FRI  .000784  7.22 
SAT  .000792  4.48 
Lags of Rr  Lags of ui 
1  .1058  16.78  3.5203  4.60 
2  —.0116  —2.13  1.2732  1.57 
3  .0208  3.58  -.68  18  -.91 
4  .0295  4.83  -.3772  —.46 
5  .0225  3.79  -1.7406  -2.23 
6  -.0040  -.68  .3874  .55 
7  -.0143  -2.52  .0387  .49 
8  .0146  2.43  -1.2369  -1.36 
9  .0031  .55  -1.2669  -1.51 
10  .0029  .49  .2546  .30 
11  .0086  1.54  1.1101  1.47 
12  .0091  1.46  —1.2546  -1.73 
13  -.0084  -1.38  -.0145  -.20 
14  .0071  1.20  .2611  .37 
15  .0011  .18  .1450  .19 
16  -.0025  -.41  -.2778  -.38 
17  -.0036  -.60  .5093  .74 
18  .0044  .77  1.0052  1.39 
19  .0058  1.04  -1.5081  -2.04 
20  .0057  .96  -.2  122  -.28 
21  -.0007  -.12  .0607  .08 
22  .0057  1.00  .8097  1.20 
Sum of 
22 lags  .2018  8.83  .8045  .90 
F—test for 
Equal Daily Means  30.61 
.026 
Notet  Equation (4) ii  eatimated  iteratively using  weighted  leaat  squares, along with equation  (3) (see Table 4b). 
The t-statistics use Hansen's  1982) correction for autocorrelation and  heteroskedaeticity to calculate  the standard 
errors, with 44 lags of the residual autocovariances and a damping factor  of .7 (the  RATS computer program  Wa, 
used to perform all of the calculations).  The coefficient of determination,  R2, is from the ordinary least squares 
version  of these  regressions. 
11 Table 4b -  - Estimates of Autoregressive Model  for Daily Stock Volatility, Including Effects 
of Lagged Unexpected Stock Returns,  1885-1987,  (using 22 lags and iterative 
weighted least squares) 
Variable  Coefficient  T-stat  Coefficient  T-stat 
MON  .002352  12.75 
TUE  .001898  10.37 
WED  .001864  11.36 
THU  .001265  6.49 
FRI  .001477  8.42 
SAT  -.001131  -5.20 
Lags of Iuj  Lags of u 
.1162  8.23  -.0770  -5.19 
2  .0947  8.30  -.0836  -8.69 
3  .0825  7.48  —.0624  -7.05 
4  .0469  3.89  —.0488  -4.21 
5  .0495  5.34  -.0415  -4.63 
6  .0693  6.06  -.0408  -4.23 
7  .0237  1.99  -.0330  -3.73 
8  .0380  2.74  -.0307  -2.89 
9  .0232  1.95  —.0315  -3.15 
10  .0182  1.63  —.0155  -1.56 
11  .0328  2.97  —.0118  —1.35 
12  .0372  3.62  .0086  .84 
13  .0094  .91  —.0152  -1.87 
14  .0224  2.40  .0013  .14 
15  .0250  2.81  —.0049  -.52 
16  .0066  .67  .0102  1.12 
17  .0205  2.11  -.0061  -.70 
18  .0305  3.12  .0164  2.02 
19  .0158  1.63  .0071  .79 
20  .0295  3.82  .0066  .81 
21  .0018  .20  -.0018  -.24 
22  .0343  3.44  -.0090  -1.20 
Sum of 
22 lags  .8281  41.76  —.4636  —6.49 
F-test for 
Equal Daily Means  78.62 
R2  .265 
Note  Equation  (3) is estimated  iteratively using weighted least squares, along  with equation (4) (see Table 4a). 
The t-etatiticg use Hansen's  11982] correction for autocorrelation and  heteroekedasticity to calculate the standard 
errors, with 44 lags of the residual autocovariarces  and a damping factor  of .7 (the  RATS computer program was 
used to perform all of the calculations),  The coefficient of determination,  R2, is from the ordinary  least  squarec 
version of these  regressions. 
12 t-statistic of 4.6),  but the remaining 21  coefficients have  random signs and most  are less than 2 
standard errors from 0.  The sum of the 22 S's is .8045,  with a t-statistic of .90.  Thus, there is weak 
evidence  that an increase in volatility increases the expected future return to stocks. 
Table 4b contains estimates of (3),  the model relating stock volatility to lagged stock returns 
and  volatility.  The  day-of-the—week  intercepts are similar to the estimates in Table 3.  The 
coefficients 'y. measure  the  effect  of  lagged  unexpected stock returns on stock volatility.  The 
coefficients from lags  1  to 11 are all negative, and most are more than 3 standard errors from 0.  The 
sum of the 22 lag coefficients is -.46, with a t-statistic of —6.49.  The sum of the autoregressive 
coefficients p is .8281, about 20 percent  larger than the sum in Table 3,  One interpretation of this 
regression model is that volatility  is related to lagged stock  returns. The coefficient of lagged positive 
returns is  p, while the  coefficient for lagged  negative returns is ('i-p1).  Thus,  there  is  strong 
evidence that a large negative stock return increases predictions of future volatility more than an 
equivalent positive return. This extends the earlier evidence on the asymmetric  reaction of  volatility 
to return shocks. 
3.4  Models for Daily Stock [olwilitv  Using  High-Low Spreads 
Parkinson  jl980] and Garman and Klass (1980] create efficient estimators of the variance of 
returns using extreme values of prices.  Garman and Klass show that a variance estimator based  on 
the percentage (high-low) spread is oer 5 times  as efficient as the estimator based on daily stock 
returns. They note, however,  that infrequent trading biases downward the extreme values estimator 
and would reduce its efficiency. 
I  got  high,  low  and  closing  values of  the  S&P  composite portfolio since  1980  from 
COMPUSERVE.  I estimate  the following  model for daily stock returns, 
5  22  22  22 
R =  E  o,  +  E  R  + E 8  Iu,. + E £  (n(H.m/L.m)  + u,,  (5) 
=1  j= 1  k=1  m=I 
'Beckers  1983( finds that the high-low spread variance estimator does  help predict future close-to-close variance estimates 
for individual stocks, although the improvements  are not as large as Garmari'Xlass analysis suggests. 
13 where fn(H,/L,) is the percent spread for day t. The model for daily volatility uses lags of the spread, 
of the absolute  errors JuI,  and of the errors u, from (5), 
5  22  22  22 
uj  =  E  o, D  +  E  p JuJ +  E  'y u,  +  E  0  fn(H,.m/L)  + v,, 
1=2  k1  m=5 
where  the coefficients  measure the relation between past spreads  and current conditional volatility. 
Table 5a contains estimates of the return equation (5).  Table Sb contains estimates  of the volatility 
model (6).  Both equations  also include a dummy variable  equal to 1 from January 1980 - December 
i983, and  0 after  1984.  Standard & Poor's changed  the way they calculate  the high-low values in 
January 1984. A plot of the high-low spread for the S&P portfolio compared with the spread for the 
Dow Jones industrial Average over the 1980-1988 period shows that S&P spreads drop noticeably at 
that time.8  The dummy variable. SPDUM,  adjusts for the change in the level of measured spreads 
in  1984. 
The spread data do not help predict stock returns in Table Sa.  Only one  of the spread 
coefficient estimates. 2n' is more than two standard errors from 0, and the sum is  negative.  If 
spreads proxy for volatility, these coefficients  should be positive.  The estimates in Table Sa for the 
1980—1987  sample are different from the estimates  for the 1885-1987 sample in Tables 3 and 4a.  For 
example, while the intercept for Monday returns is negative, it is only + standard  error from 0.  The 
autoregressive  coefficient at lag i, p  = .09, is close to the value in Table 3 (.10). but the pattern of 
negative coefficients after lag  10 results  in the sum of the 22 lags close to 0.  The coefficients on 
lagged  volatility S are larger than the estimates in Table 4a, and the sum  for 22  lags is  9.6. 
Nevertheless,  the estimates  are imprecise, so there is only  weak evidence that expected returns are 
related to past volatility. 
Table Sb shows  evidence  that  lagged  spreads add significant information in predicting 
volatility.  The coefficient of the spread  at lag  I, U,, is almost 3 standard errors above 0.  The sum 
°One possibility is that 5&P used the highest and lowest prices for each stock in the portfolio during the day to create 
the high/low values for the portfolio prinr In 1954.  Since  1984, it seems  that they  evaluate the value  of the portfolio frequently 
throughout the day.  The  latter prncedure matches the theory behind the Parkinson estimator, and is bound to produce a 
smaller measured spread. 
14 Table 5a —— Estimates of the Relation Between Stock Returns, Lagged Stock Returns,  Day— 
of-the-Week Intercepts,  Lagged Stock Volatility and Lagged Spreads, Eq. (5) 
(S&P Composite Portfolio,  1980-87) 
Variable  Cgf  T-sta(  T-stat  gf  T-stat 
MON  -.000441  -.52 
TUE  .000527  .69 
WED  .001373  2.22 
THU  .000246  .35 
FRI  .001021  1.47 
SPDUM  .000342  .28 
Lags of R,  Lags of IuJ  Lags of fn(H/L,) 
1  .0929  5.20  .2503  .10  -.0489  -1.31 
2  .0042  .21  6.4470  2.29  -.0196  -.57 
3  -.0059  -.29  -.5886  -.20  -.0642  -2.07 
4  -.0038  -.18  .1484  .05  .0247  .62 
5  .0003  .02  -3.7487  -1.19  .0436  1.18 
6  —.0066  -.31  .8697  .37  -.0456  -1.37 
7  .0037  .17  5.7284  1.82  -.0147  -.45 
8  .0164  .83  -.7434  -.24  .0106  .32 
9  .0067  .32  .5386  .19  .0547  1.53 
10  —.0114  -.53  1.1 126  .43  -.0485  —1.39 
11  -.0201  -1.00  3.3033  1.18  -.0500  —1.60 
12  .0266  1.22  -.5188  -.19  .0140  .36 
13  -.0020  -.09  1.0094  .42  .0326  .92 
14  —.0178  —.83  —2.7541  —1.11  —.0299  -.81 
15  -.0090  -.43  -1.5764  -.47  .0221  .55 
16  -.0211  -.85  -4.6921  -205  .0290  .96 
17  .0053  .21  .5486  .20  .0334  .78 
18  -.0210  -1.18  5.0628  1.27  -.0055  -.18 
19  —.0031  -.15  —4.7302  -1.89  .0338  1.18 
20  -.0133  -.58  3.5107  1.59  -.0333  -1.13 
21  —.0085  -.33  -4.8909  -1.88  -.0126  -.35 
22  -.0 128  -.55  5.3360  2.05  .0080  .26 
Sum of 
22 lags  -.0002  -.00  9.6224  1.20  -.0662  -.67 
F-test for 
Equal  Daily Means  1,98 
R2  .063 
Nole  Equation  (5) i eitimated  iteratively  using weighted leaat squares, along with equation (6) (see Table 7b). 
The t-statistics uze Hansen's 119821 correction for autocorrelation and  heteroekedasticity to calculate the standard 
errors, with  44 lags of the residual autocoyariances and a damping factor  of .7 (the RATS computer program was 
used to perform alt of the calculations). The coefficient  of determination,  R2, is from the ordinary least  squares 
version of these regressions. 
15 Table 5b —- Estimates of the Relation Between Stock Volatility, Lagged Stock Volatility, Day- 
of- the-  Week Intercepts, Lagged Stock Return Shocks and  Lagged Spreads, Eq.(6) 
(S&P Composite Portfolio,  1980-87) 
Variable  CQf  T-stat  Qgj  T-stat  T-stat 
MON  .0044  5.97 
TUE  .0035  5,55 
WED  .0028  5.17 
THU  .0027  4.25 
FRI  .0024  4.60 
SPDUM  -.0037  -4,26 
Lags of UI  Lags of u  Lags of fn(H/L) 
1  .0341  .68  —.1069  -1.85  .1730  2.78 
2  -.0341  -.66  -.0604  -2.30  .0282  .35 
3  .0531  1.07  —.0132  —.50  .0463  1.11 
4  .0691  1.34  .0243  .78  —.0669  -.80 
5  .0543  1.11  —.0359  —1.74  .0111  .17 
6  —.0462  -1.53  .0182  .92  .0716  1.28 
7  .0389  1.21  -.0653  -2.57  -.0064  -.11 
8  —.0501  —1.49  —.0145  -.67  .1236  2.93 
9  —.0198  -.49  -.0145  -.73  —.0150  -.31 
10  .0020  .07  .0029  .13  -.0189  -.40 
11  .0564  2.23  .0130  .67  —.0108  -.28 
12  .0089  .24  .0205  .79  —.0558  —1.25 
13  .0127  .29  .0417  2.04  .0125  .32 
14  -.0014  -.04  -.0276  -1.55  -.0082  -.17 
15  .0376  1.23  .0234  1.30  .0174  .31 
16  -.0824  -2.56  -.0005  -.03  .0652  1.34 
17  .0608  1.36  .0180  .78  —.0681  —1.13 
18  .0124  .36  .0124  .69  .0064  .10 
19  .0197  .54  .0346  .79  .0035  .06 
20  -.0266  -.66  -.0181  -.99  .0340  .52 
21  -.0259  -.81  .0067  .35  .0011  .02 
22  —.0756  -2.45  .0359  2.10  .0751  1.81 
Sum of 
22 lags  .0978  .70  -.105  1  —.95'  .4187  4.44 
F—test for 
Equal Daily Means  2.34 
R2  .156 
Note  Equation (6) ic estimated  iteratively  using weighted leaat squares, along with equation (5) (see Table 7a). 
The t-statistics use  Hansen's [19821 correction  for  autocorrelation  and  heteroskedaaticity to calculate the standard 
errors, with 44 lags of the residual autocovariances and a damping factor  of .7 (the RATS computer program  woo 
used to perform all of the calculations).  The coefficient of determination,  R2, is from the ordinary least squares 
version of these regreasions. 
16 for 22 lags is .42, over 4 standard errors above 0.  The coefficient on SPDUM  is reliably negative, 
adjusting for the higher level of spreads in  1980-1983.  Compared  with Table 4b, the coefficients 
on lagged  values of u  and  Iuj are smaller and they have smaller t-statistics.  The sum for 22 lags is 
.098 for lu and -.105 for u.  Again, volatility  increases more following  a large negative return than 
following  a large positive return, but the size of the effect seems to be smaller.  Because the spread 
contains  less estimation error than lagged absolute residuals,  it is not surprising that including  lagged 
spreads reduces the predictive ability of lagged absolute residuals. 
3.5  Models for Monthly Stock Volatility. 1885-1987 
One disadvantage  of the results  in Tables 3, 4a and 4b is that it is difficult to graph so many 
estimates of daily volatility.9  It is also difficult to determine the persistence  of volatility using high 
order autoregressions,°  Following French, Schwert and Stambaugh  [1987),  1 calculate  the sample 
standard deviation within each month from 1885- 1987.  Next, I estimate  an autoregressive model 
for the standard deviation estimate for month m 
12  12 
On=  E  oD,,÷  m.i+Vn  (7j 
i=1  j=1 
When  daily volatility changes  slowly,  this  procedure is a useful approximation.  The errors-tn- 
variables problem stressed by Pagan and Ullah [1988) is reduced, since the monthly regressors  Om, 
contain less estimation  error than the daily regressors u). Table 6 contains estimates of  the 12c order 
autoregressive model  for  Om.  including  different  monthly  intercepts a.  The  coefficient of 
determination R2 from the monthly model in Table 6 (.556) is much larger than from the daily model 
in Table 3 (.237).  The sum of  the autoregressive  coefficients from the monthly model (.898) is larger 
°For example, a 9 inch wide graph on a 300 data-per-inch  laser printer can accommodate  only 2,700 data items. 
ttFor  example, using aS MB virtual machine  on an IBM  4361 using a CMS operating system, I was unable to estimate 
more complicated models than those in this paper using the mainframe  version of the RATS computer program wllhoLt runotog 
out of available memory. 
17 than from the daily model  (.686)11 There is weak evidence that the monthly  intercepts are not equal 
(F = 3.33, with a p-value = .0001). 
Table 6 —-  Estimates of 12th  Autoregressive Model for Monthly Stock Volatility, Including 
Different Monthly  Intercepts, 1885-1987 
Variable  Coefficient  T— statistics 
Jan  .0001  .03 
Feb  .0002  .11 
Mar  .0058  2.54 
Apr  .0014  .65 
May  .0057  2.23 
Jun  .0045  2.06 
Jul  .0028  1.24 
Aug  .0054  2.60 
Sep  .0084  3.49 
Oct  .0112  3.13 
Nov  .0042  1.79 
Dec  .0025  1.01 
LaRS o( dependent variable. 
1  .4613  8.04 
2  .0765  1.78 
3  .0112  .25 
4  .0777  1.58 
5  .0318  .71 
6  .0793  1.72 
7  .0546  1.30 
8  .0805  1.75 
9  —.0511  -1.28 
10  .0470  1.16 
11  .0102  .27 
12  .0186  .48 
Sum of 
22 lags  .8976  20.89 
F—test for 
Equal Daily Means  3.33 
.556 
Notr Estimates of • 12°' order autoregressive model  for monthly stock volatility  including different intercept! for 
•ach month of the year.  The t-stalietics  use Hansen'! [1982] correction for heteroskedasticity to calculate the 
standard  error!. 
"On the other hand, the sum for the daily model i5 equivalent to a one month period, and the first monthly coefficient 
i  only .461. This shows that the assumption  of constant volatility within the month that is implicit in Table 6 is not acOurOtO. 
18 Figure  1  shows  the predictions of monthly stock volatility from Table 6,  From 1886-1926, 
using the Dow Jones portfolios to estimate volatility, the conditional standard deviation is between 
.02 and  08 per month. It increases in 1893 and in the financial panic of 1907.  Otherwise,  there are 
no dramatic movements  in conditional volatility during this period. 
Figure 1  -- Estimates of Monlhl Stock Return Volatility from Table 6, 1886-1987 
The number of stocks  in the Dow Jones portfolio increases from 12 in  1885 to 50 by 1926. 
Nevertheless, there are no obvious  changes  in the portfolio standard deviation in the months  near 
the changes. Moreover, the Dow Jones portfolio volatility  is similar to the S&P portfolio volatility 
in  1928.  Thus, there is  little reason  to  believe  that the size or composition  of the portfolio has 
important effects on the time  series behasior of volatility.10 
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Cecee  9o •:The most notable episodes  of high volatility are from 1929-1934, 1937-1938,  1946.  1973- 
1974 and 1987.  Officer [1973) and Schwert  [1987) have documented that many macroeconomic  time 
series, such as the money growth rate and industrial production, were also more volatile during the 
Great  Depression  (1929-l938).  Nevertheless,  as  stressed by  Schwert [l987J,  the  increase in 
macroeconomic  volatility is not large enough to explain all of the increase in stock market volatility 
duringthis period.  Schwert also shows shat changes  in aggregate financial leverage following  the 
stock market crash of 1929 are  too small to explain  the sharp rise in stock volatility during the 
Depression. 
Thus, the plot in Figure 1 confirms the analysis of Tables 1  and 2.  Episodes of high stock 
volatility in the past have occurred in a few brief  spans of time.  The plot also confirms the analysis 
of Tables  3, 4b and Sb, that volatility is persistent.  Once it rises, it usually remains high for many 
months.  As noted by Schwert  [1989), many periods of high volatility correspond to business cycle 
recessions  or crises in the banking system. 
4.  How Unusual Was the '87 Crash? 
4.1  Daily S&P returns 
There are many  ways to measure the extent to which  the October 1987 crash and its aftermath 
was unusual.  One somewhat mechanical method is to add dummy variables to equations (3) and (4). 
Two dummy  variables: 
087 =  1, from October 20-30, 1987, and 0 otherwise,  and 
N87  1, from November  2-30, 1987, and 0 otherwise, 
are used to estimate the effects of the crash on returns and volatility. Table 7 contains  estimates and 
t—statistics for the dummy variable coefficients. The, autoregressive  model for returns predicts that 
the large drop in stock prices on October 19 would persist for the next month. On the other hand, 
the positive effect of lagged volatility  on returns predicts higher than average returns after October 
19.  The estimates  in Table  7 say that stock returns were higher than predicted from October 20-30 
relative to the model  in equations (3) and (4).  They are lower than predicted from November 2-30, 
20 Table 7 ——  Effects of the Crash of 1987:  Estimates  of Differential Intercepts in Autoregressi' 
Models for Dali',  Stock Returns and Volatility, Eq. (3) and (4), (using 22 lags ar.d 
iterati'se  weighted  least squares) 
Ocio/'er,  1987  November. 1987  Joint F-test 
Effect on Returns,  R 
Coefficient  0213  -0079  18.31 
(t—statistic1 p—value)  (4.63)  (—3.97)  (.0000) 
Effect  on Vo1atilit', 
Coefficient  -.0108  -.9051  23.06 
(t-statistic/p-value)  (-5.52)  (-3.43  (.0000) 
Notet  The model, in equations  4  if r  dui.y sI ok returns) and  (3) (for daily stock volattitty) are estimated, alone 
wtth dummy variables  087 = 5  fr..ro October 20-30, 1987, and N87  1,  from  Novembre 2-30 1987, and 0 
otherwise. The coeff,cicnt erimates in Totes 4a and  4b are not reported because they are simtlar. The  dummy 
variable cnetfiniectestimates and thee Hansen [19821  S—statistics  are reported here.  The F statistic tests whether 
the two coefficients  are jointly d.fferer.' Ic  en 0  tte p—value is in parentheses bel.,w  the F-test.  See  notes so 
Tables 4a and 4b for more information, 
1987,  Both of these coefficient estimates have t-statistics near 4 in absolute value. Since the October 
dummy variable equals  I for 9 days and the November  dummy variable equals I for 20 days, the net 
effect of these tto months on the S&P  index is close to zero, 
From Table 4b. the large drop in stock prices on October 19 predicts future volatility to be 
much higher. The estimates  of the October and November  coefficients for stock volatility are both 
negative and several standard errors below 0.  Thus, while volatility  was high relative to its historical 
average in the weeks after the October 1987 crash, it was below the prediction of the model for stock 
returns and volatility in Tables 4a and 4b.  In essence, the stock market returned to relatively normal 
levels of volatility quickly at the end of 1987. 
Another way to tell whether the 1987 crash was unusual is to compare it to previous crashes, 
Figure 2 plots the average absolute error from the estimate  of equation (4j in Table 4b, uj, for the 
10 most negative daily otock returno  in Table  I  (excluding  October 19,  1987) for 66 days (about 3 
months) before and after these 'crashes.'  It also plots u( for the October 19, 1987 crash.  All of these 
values are expressed in units of monthly standard deviations  (i.e., they are multiplied by (253  12) j. 
21 Figure  2  -—  Average  Standard Deiatiori of Daily Stock Returns Around Crashes, Relative  to 
the Behavior Around the October  19, 1987 Crash, (expressed in units of monthly 
standard deviations) 
This graph  shows that volatility typically  declines after crashes, and that the October  1987 crash looks 
like the average  crash,  except  that it has a much larger value on day 0.  It also seems that volatility 
was lower before the October 1987 crash than for the average of the other crashes. 
Figure 3 is similar  to Figure 2, except that it plots the predictions  from equation (3) in Table 
4b. There are two notable differences between the October 1987 crash and the average crash.  First, 
the level of predicted volatility was lower in 1987 than for the average.  Second,  for the five days 
after October 19, predicted volatility remained above the average  for the other crashes.  After that. 
the conditional volatility of stock returns behaved like the average for previous crashes. Relative to 
pre—crash levels, stock volatility  rose  and fell faster around October 19 than the evidence from the 
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Together, Figue 7 and 3 confirm the evidence in Table 7.  Stock volatility fell faster after 
the October 19, 1987 cra'h than either the model in Table 4b, or than evidence from previous crashes 
imply. While the stock market remained quite volatile in the days after Biack  Monday,' it was not 
as volatile as historical evidence  would  predict. 
4.2  Implied Volatilits' from the Optiout Market 
Figure 4 plots the implied volatility from call options on the S&P 500 portfolio.  I got dail 
option prices from the Dow Jones New's Retrieval Service  from April l98 - December 1988. 1 use 
Merton's [l973j option pricing model for stocks  paying  continuous dividends to solve for the level 
23 
8w 
,, 5  ,,_  3=  3=  .,-  ca .  —= 
t)  rj  i., Pet 
Figure 3 -- .4serage  Predicted Standard Deviation  of Daily Stock Returns Around  Crashes, 
Relaise to the Behasior Around the October 19. 1987 Crash, (expressed in units 
of monthly  standar  I deviations) Figure  4  - - Implied Monthl Standard  Deviation  of Standard &  Poor's 500 Portfolio from 
Daily Call Option Prices, April 1987  —  December  1988 
of stock return volatility that is consistent with the option prices.13  I use the option whose exerctse 
price is closest to the current stock price to calculate the implied volatility. Many studies have shown 
that close-to-the-money option prices  convey the most information about the expectations of the 
options market concerning future volatility.14 
use an interest  rate of 6 percent in these calculations.  Since short—term  interest  rates were relatively stable during 
this time period, using a more  accurate measure of  the interest rate  for each day would have little  effect en the implied 
volatility calculations.  I  use the yield on the S&tP portfolio 3.7 percent. 
'4Day and Lewis [tOSS].  t  also calculated several average measures of implied votatility, averaging across options with 
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I  29,  1067 —  04ce,rr  00,  1906 Several things are clear from this graph.  First, option traders' perceptions of stock volatility 
did not rise until October 19, and they remained high for the next couple of months.  The implied 
standard deviation rose from less than .04 per month to over  .09 per month on the 19.  It decayed 
back down to its pre-crash level by March  1988 and remained at that level throughout 1988. 
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Figure 5 -- Comparison of Implied Market Standard Deviations from Weekly  U.S. and U.K 
Call Option Prices, 1987 
Figure  5 compares  implied standard deviations from call options  on the S&P portfolio ith 
the implied standard deviations from call options on the Financial Times  Stock Exchange portfolio 
(FTSE) from Franks  and Schwartz [1988, Table 11,  Franks and Schwartz use weekly data from Mas 
1984 through November 1987. While the volatility of British stock returns is higher than for the S&P 
returns, the time pattern is  the same.  Implied  standard deviations almost tripled from the week 
ended  October 16 to the week of the crash.  Volatility  declined faster in the U.S.  than in the U.K. 
25 during the remainder of October and November. 
4.3  Evidence front she Futures  Market 
Arbitrage forces the price of the S&P futures contract to mimic the index.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable  to expect the volatility of futures prices  to be similar to the volatility of stock prices. 
Nevertheless,  Edwards [1988]  shows  that the variance of daily futures returns  has been 40 to  50 
percent larger than the variance of  S&P stock returns since 1982 when these futures began trading.15 
There are several reasons why this might occur.  First, variation in the expected real return, or in the 
dividend yield,  to the S&P portfolio could explain  some of this difference (although preliminary 
calculations  suggest  these factors  are unlikely to  explain  the extra variation in futures returns). 
Second,  becsuse  not all stocks  in the S&P  portfolio trade at the end of the day, the measured  stock 
index smooths  volatility of the 'true' value of the underlying stocks (e.g.,  Scholes  and Williams 
1977]). Third, because transactions  costs are lower in futures markets, investors with macroeconomic 
information are likely to trade in futures markets rather than the stock market. The extra volatility 
in futures prices may reflect information that would  not be worth trading on in the stock market. 
Arbitrage between  futures  and  stock markets  would  prevent large disparities between prices  to 
persist, but it would not prevent small short-run variations.  Finally, 'speculation' or 'noise tradint' 
in futures markets may induce extra volatility into futures prices (e.g., Shiller [1984],  Black [1986] 
and Summers  [1986]). 
Futures prices reflect the value of the portfolio  at a point in time.  Thus,  the intraday (high- 
low) futures spread is probably a better measure of volatility than the (high—low) spread  for stocks. 
If nothing  else, there is no problem of nonsynchronnus trading. Thus, even though futures volatilits 
is larger than stock volatility, past volatility  or spreads from futures may help predict stock return 
volatility. 
Figure  6 plots three estimates of the volatility  of the S&P portfolio:  (i) the standard deviation 
estimated from the most recent 21 daily (high-low) spreads for the S&P portfolio; (ii) the standard 
Iuturee returns, (n]F/F,1), measure the percent change in the futures price.  Since there  15  nu net invessrncns in 
future! cnntract, these are nut rates ci return in the usuat sense  ci the ward. 
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Figure  6 -—  Estimates of Standard Deiations  from  Daily  S&P Stock Prices, Futures Prices 
and Call Option Prices. 1987-88 (Stock and futures prices  use spreads n'H L' 
deviation estimated  from the moss recent  21 S&P futures (high-low)  spreads; and (iii) the implied 
standard deviation from  the  S&P call options, for 1987_ 1988.16  It  is clear from this plot that the 
volatility estimates from the futures market are similar to the estimates from the stock market, 
except around October 19.  The futures price at the end of trading on that day was welt below the 
stock price, and the swings within the day were larger. In part, this was due to the lack  of timei 
quotes in the stock market. The increase in estimated volatility in both the futures and stock markets 
was much larger than in the options market.  Nevertheless,  before October  19,  1987,  and  after 
use the Parkinson  19801 variance estimator, 
8= .393  (E  ln(H/L,0/21 j 
where fn(H/L1l  is the percentage (high!ow) spread on day 1. 
27 
590331  950  3  66  55 January 1988, the three measures of  stock market volatility are similar. All three measures  show that 
stock volatility  returned to pre-crash levels by early 1988 and remained  low throughout the remainder 
of 1988. 
5.  Conclusions 
The  stock market crash of October 19,  1987 has already  been studied under a variety of 
microscopes.  This paper  focuses on the effect of  the 20 percent drop in stock prices on the volatility 
of stock market returns.  In particular, it analyzes whether the behavior of daily returns before and 
after the 1987 crash was unusual relative to the experience of over 100 years of  daily data.  While the 
1987 crash was the largest one day percentage  change  in prices  in over 28,000  observations,  it was 
also  unusual in  that  stock market volatility returned  to  low pre-crash  levels  quickly.  Two 
comparisons  support this conclusion.  First,  the prediction model  for stock volatility includes 
significant  negative differential intercepts for  the days from October20 through November  30, 1987. 
Second,  compared with the next 10 most negative  daily stock returns, volatility rose faster at the 
time of the October 19 crash, and it fell faster afterwards. 
Evidence from the Options and futures markets  also supports this conclusion. Estimates  from 
these markets from 1987—1988  show that stock volatility dropped to pre—crash levels by early 1988 
and remained low.  These data  are only available for the last 6 years, so they cannot be used to study 
prior crashes.  Nevertheless,  they provide  more accurate  estimates  of volatility than the methods  using 
daily stock returns.  When they are available,  they corroborate the conclusions  from the much larger 
sample of stock returns.  Moreover,  data from option prices on British stocks  have the same pattern 
of stock volatility. 
This paper also estimates  new  models for the behavior of stock volatility. I parameterize the 
asymmetric  reaction of volatility to negative returns using  lagged return shocks along with lagged 
measures of volatility. 1 also use lagged (high-low)  spreads to help predict volatility when these data 
are available. 
Schwert  [1987,  19891 shows that stock volatility  was higher during recessions and around the 
major banking panics  in  the  19h and  early 20 centuries.  In  part,  this  is  an  example of the 
28 asymmetry  in the return-volatility relation.  Negative returns lead to larger increases in volatility than 
positive returns.  Nevertheless, this historical evidence points Out another difference between the 
1987 crash and earlier periods of high  volatility.  There has been  no major crisis in the US. financial 
system, and there has been  no recession accompanying  the  1987 crash. 
Instead of a  microscope,  the volatility plots  in  this  paper can  be  thought of  like  an 
electrocardiogram  (ECG). They reflect the pulse of financial markets by measuring the rate of price 
changes.  They show the risk borne by investors in the stock market, and where stock volatility 
reflects uncertainty about more fundamental  economic aggregates  (e.g., Schwert  [19871), they provide 
information about the health of the economy. 
29 References 
Beckers, Stan, "Variances of Security Price Returns Based on High, Low and Closing Prices," 
Journal of Business, 56 (1983) 97—112. 
Benston, George S., "Required  Disclosure  and  the Stock  Market:  An Evaluation of the 
Securities  Exchange Act of 1934," American Economic Review, 63 (1973) 132-155. 
Black, Fischer, "Studies of Stock Price Volatility Changes,'  Proceedings of the 1976 Meetings 
of the Business and Economics Statistics Section, American  Statistical  Association, 
(1976) 177-181. 
Black, Fischer, 'Noise," Journal of Finance,  41(1986) 529-542. 
Bol]erslev, Tim, "Generalized  Autoregressive  Conditional Heteroskedasticity,"  Journal of 
Econometrics, 31(1986) 307-328. 
Christie,  Andrew A  .,"The Stochastic Behavior of Common Stock Variances: Value,  Leverage 
and Interest Rate Effects,  Journal of Financial Economics, 10 (1982) 407-432. 
Cowles,  Alfred III and Associates,  Common Stock  Indexes.  2nd ed., Cowies Commission 
Monograph no. 3,  Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, Inc., 1939. 
Cutler, David  M,, James  M. Poterba  and Lawrence H. Summers, "What Moves Stock Prices? 
Journal of Portfolio Management, (forthcoming  1989). 
Davidian, M. and R.J. Carroll. 'Variance Function Estimation,' Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 82 (1987)1079—1091. 
Day, Theodore  E. and Craig M. Lewis, "The Behavior of the Volatility Implicit  in the Prices 
of Stock Index Options,' Journal of Financial Economics, 22 (1988) 103-122. 
Dow Jones & Co., The Dow Jones Averages, 1885-1970, ed. Maurice L. Farrell, New York: 
Dow Jones & Co.,  1972. 
Edwards,  Franklin  R., "Does Futures Trading Increase Stock Volatility?'  Financial Analrsis 
Journal, (January-February 1988) 63-69. 
Engle,  Robert F., "Autoregressive  Conditional  Heteroskedasticity  with Estimates  of the 
Variance of United Kingdom  Inflation,' Econometrica, 50 (1982) 987-1007. 
Engle, Robert F. and Tim Bollerslev, "Modeling the Persistence of Conditional Variances," 
Econometric Reviews, 5 (1986) 1-50. 
Engle, Robert F., David M. Lilien and Russell P. Robins, "Estimating  Time Varying Risk 
Premia in the Term Structure:  The ARCH-M Model,'  Econometrica, 55 (1987) 391- 
407. 
Fisher, Lawrence,  "Some New Stock-Market  Indexes,' Journal of Business, 29 (1966) 191- 
225, 
Franks, Julian R. and Eduardo S.  Schwartz, 'The Stochastic Behavior of Market Variance 
Implied in the Prices of Index Options:  Evidence on Leverage,  Volume and Other 
Effects,'  unpublished working  paper  #10-88,  Anderson  Graduate  School  of 
Management,  U.C.L.A.,  1988, French,  Kenneth  R.,  "Stock  Returns and  the  Weekend  Effect," Journal  of  Financial 
Economics, 8 (1980) 55-69. 
French, Kenneth R., G. William Schwert and Robert F. Stambaugh, "Expected Stock Returns 
and Volatility," Journal of Financial Economics, 19 (1987) 3-29. 
Garman,  Mark B. and Michael J. Kiass, "On the Estimation of Security Price Volatilities from 
Historical  Data," Journal of Business, 53 (1980) 67-78. 
Grossman,  Sanford J.,  "Program Trading and Market Volatility:  A Report on Interday 
Relationships,"  Financial Analysts Journal, (July-August 1988) 18-28. 
Hamilton,  James D,, "Rational-Expectations  Econometric Analysis of Changes in Regime: An 
Investigation of the Term Structure  of Interest Rates,' Journal of  Economic Dynamics 
and Control,  12 (1988) 385—423. 
Hansen, Lars P., 'Large Sample Properties of Generalized  Method of Moments Estimators,' 
Econometrica, 50 (1982) 1029—1054. 
Keim, Donald B. and Robert F. Stambaugh, "A Further Investigation of the Weekend Effect 
in Stock Returns," Journal of Finance,  39 (1984) 819-835. 
Macaulay,  Frederick  R., The Movements of Interest Rates Bond Yields and Stock Prices in 
the United Stales Si,ice 1856, New York: National  Bureau of Economic  Research, 
1938. 
Merton, Robert C .,"The Theory of Rational  Option Pricing,"  Bell Journal of Economics ani 
Management Science, 4 (1973) 141—183. 
Nelson, Daniel  B., "Conditional  Heteroskedasticity  in Asset Returns:  A  New Approach." 
unpublished  manuscript,  University of Chicago,  1988, 
Officer, Robert R., "The Variability of the Market Factor of New York Stock Exchange" 
Journal of Business, 46 (1973) 434—453. 
Pagan,  Adrian  and Aman Ullah, "The Econometric  Analysis of Models with Risk Terms, 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, (1988). 
Parkinson,  Michael, "The Extreme  Value Method for Estimating  the Variance of the Rate of 
Return,' Journal of Business, 53 (1980) 61-65. 
Poterba,  James  M. and  Lawrence H. Summers, 'The Persistence of  Volatility and  Stock Market 
Fluctuations,"  American Economic Review, 76 (1986) 1142-1151. 
Scholes, Myron  and Joseph Williams, "Estimating Betas from Non-synchronous Data," Journal 
of Financial Economics, 5(1977) 309-327. 
Schwert, G. William, 'Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change Over Time?' Working Paper 
No. GPB87-l  I, University of Rochester, 1987. 
Schwert,  G.  William, "Business Cycles,  Financial Crises  and Stock Volatility,"  Carnegie- 
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, (forthcoming 1989). 
Shiller, Robert J., "Stock Prices and  Social Dynamics,'  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
(1984) 457-498. 
ii Smith, Walter  B.  and  Arthur  H.  Cole,  Fluctuations  in  American  Business,  179OJ86O, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935. 
Standard & Poor's,  Security Price Index Record, 1986 ed., New York: Standard & Poor's 
Corp., 1986. 
Summers,  Lawrence  H., Does the Stock Market Rationally  Reflect Fundamental Values?' 
Journal of Finance, 41(1986)591-601. 
Wilson,Jack  W., Richard  Sylla and Charles P. Jones, Financia1 Market Volatility and Panics 
Before  1914,' unpublished working paper, Department  of Economics and Business, 
North Carolina State University, 1988. 
111 